Whether conservatives or radicals were in charge of a state, the party with less power did not implicitly accept the result. For example, the sweeping provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution lasted only 14 years. In 1790, the Conservatives won power within the state legislature, called for a new constitutional convention, and rewrote the Constitution. The new Constitution significantly reduced universal white-man suffrage, gave the governor veto power and patronage appointment power, and added to the legislative power of a single chamber an upper house with significant patrimonial qualifications. The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judicial, in the same hands, whether between one, some or many, and hereditary, self-independent or subject to elections, can rightly be described as the very definition of tyranny. Therefore, if the Federal Constitution were really with the accumulation of power or with a mixture of powers that would have a dangerous tendency towards such accumulation, there would be no need for additional arguments to cause a universal fracture of the system. I am convinced, however, that it is clear to everyone that the accusation cannot be supported and that the maxim on which it is based has been totally misinterpreted and misplaced. To have correct ideas on this important subject, it will be necessary to study the sense in which the preservation of freedom requires that the three major departments of power be separate and different. The oracle, always consulted and quoted on the subject, is the famous Montesquieu. If he is not the author of this invaluable commandment in political science, he at least has the merit of showing it and recommending it most effectively to humanity. First of all, we are trying to determine its importance on this point. For Montesquieu, the British Constitution was what Homer was to didactic writers on epic poetry.
Given that the latter considered the work of the immorable bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of epic art were to be drawn and on the basis of which all similar works were to be judged, this great political critic seems to have considered the Constitution of England as a reference, or to use his own expression, as a mirror of political freedom; and, in the form of elementary truths, to have provided the various principles characteristic of this particular system. To be sure not to confuse its meaning in this case, let`s go back to the source where the maxim comes from. At the slightest glance at the British Constitution, we must recognise that the legislature, the executive and the judiciary are not totally separate and separate. The executive judge is an integral part of the legislators. It alone has the prerogative to conclude treaties with foreign sovereigns which, when made, have the force of legislative acts under certain restrictions. All members of the Department of Justice are appointed by him, may be dismissed by him at the address of both houses of Parliament and, if he wishes to consult them, constitute one of his constitutional councils. A branch of the legislative department also constitutes a great Constitutional Council for the chief executive, since, on the other hand, he is the sole depositary of judicial authority in impeachment cases and has the supreme court of appeal in all other cases. . . .